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IN RE INTEREST OF Z.J.H.: ARE TWO MOMS TOO
MANY?
Social fragmentation and the myriad configurations of modern families have
presented us with new problems and complexities that cannot be solved by
idealizing the past. Today a child who receives proper nutrition, adequate
schooling and supportive sustaining shelter is among the fortunate, whatever
the source. A child who also receives the love and nurture of even a single
parent can be counted among the blessed. Here this Court finds a child who
has all of the above benefits and two adults dedicated to his welfare, secure
in their loving partnership, and determined to raise him to the very best of
their considerable abilities. There is no reason in law, logic or social philoso-
phy to obstruct such a favorable situation.'
Lesbian mother (sic] has harmed these children forever. To give her rights
of reasonable visitation so that she can teach them to be homosexuals, would
be the zenith of poor judgment for the judiciary of this state. Until such
time that she can establish, after years of therapy and demonstrated con-
duct, that she is no longer a lesbian living a life of abomination (see Leviti-
cus 18:22), she should be totally estopped from contaminating these chil-
dren. After years of treatment, she could then petition for rights of
visitation. My point is: she is not fit for visitation at this time. Her conduct
is presently harmful to these children. Thus, she should have no visitation.2
INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty years, homosexuals have fought to gain rec-
ognition and acceptance in society, as well as in the courtroom. As
the two preceding quotes demonstrate, they have won some battles,
but they continue to face deeply felt hostility and bias. Although
some courts and legislatures have worked to expand family law to
accommodate the rights of homosexuals and their children, the ma-
jority has not. Custody and visitation disputes involving one or more
homosexual parents have been common since the 1970s.3 At first,
most of these disputes involved both biological parents of the child
1. In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1002 (Sur. Ct. 1992).
2. Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 896 (S.D. 1992) (Henderson, J., specially concurring
in part; dissenting in part).
3. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 459, 547
(1990).
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and took place after the parents divorced.' When it became known
that one of the parents was homosexual, that parent often faced dif-
ficulties gaining custody rights.5
This scenario still frequently appears in the courtroom and has
been joined by another. In the last few years, many lesbian couples
have decided to have and raise children together.6 Experts estimate
that hundreds, possibly thousands, of babies have been born to les-
bian mothers in recent years as a result of artificial insemination
alone.7 Some couples have two children, with each woman being the
biological or adoptive mother of one of the children.8 The children
may grow up together as siblings, call both women "mommy," and
have the same hyphenated last name.9
If a lesbian couple separates, it may face disputes involving cus-
tody and visitation identical to those experienced by separated het-
4. Id. at 464-65.
5. Like many other people, some judges hold beliefs that homosexuality is immoral, unnatural,
and destructive of society. These beliefs often appear explicitly or implicitly in judicial opinions.
Id. at 548-49; see, e.g., In re Diehl, 582 N.E.2d 281, 293 (!11. App. Ct. 1991) ("Because a par-
ent's associations are relevant to her ability to care for a child, we find that [the mother's] free-
dom of association was not violated by the trial court's consideration of her sexual orientation.");
Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d at 893 (listing a mother's "active homosexual relationships" as part of her
"myriad of psychological problems"). For commentary on various courts' approaches to homosex-
ual custody disputes, see Donald H. Stone, The Moral Dilemma: Child Custody When One Par-
ent Is Homosexual or Lesbian - An Empirical Study, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 711 (1989); Davis
S. Dooley, Comment, Immoral Because They're Bad, Bad Because They're Wrong: Sexual Orien-
tation and Presumptions of Parental Unfitness in Custody Disputes, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 395
(1989-90); Darryl Robin Wishard, Comment, Out of the Closet and into the Courts: Homosexual
Fathers and Child Custody, 93 DICK. L. REV. 401 (1989).
6. There are a variety of methods by which a lesbian may have a child. Among these methods
are: (I) conceiving with a male friend by artificial insemination; (2) artificial insemination by a
confidential donor; (3) surrogate motherhood; (4) adoption; and (5) foster parenting. HAYDEN
CURREY & DENIS CLIFFORD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES 7:6-7:30 (5th ed.
1989).
7. Scott Harris, 2 Moms or 2 Dads . . . and a Baby. Gay Parents Give Birth to Families of
Their Own, Thanks to Such Methods as Artificial Insemination and Adoption, L.A. TIMES. Oct.
20, 1991, at Al. One newspaper labeled this increase in gay parenting the "gay baby boom" and
stated that the baby boom is evidenced by the following facts: (I) "A 5-year-old New York area
organization of gay and lesbian couples, who have created their own families . . . has 1,500
households on the mailing list"; (2) "[A] primer for lesbians who want to have children . .. is in
its fourth printing"; and (3) "The first seminar on lesbian parenting held in Chicago was filled to
capacity . . . " Jean Latz Griffin, The Gay Baby Boom: Homosexual Couples Challenge Tradi-
tions as They Create New Families, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 3, 1992, § 5, at I. Although this Note
focuses on lesbian couples, gay male couples are also deciding to raise children together. Id. These
families will undoubtedly encounter the same legal problems facing lesbian couples and their
children.
8. Patrice Gaines-Carter, Lesbian Couple Say Custody Award Catches D.C. Up, WASH. POST,
Sept. 12, 1991, at A39.
9. Id.
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erosexual couples. Unfortunately, most statutes assume that custody
and visitation disagreements occur only between heterosexual, mar-
ried couples. When courts are faced with unorthodox situations,
they receive little guidance from those laws. When faced with a cus-
tody dispute between two homosexuals, most courts have declined to
expand current laws and have treated the nonbiological or nonadop-
tive mother as if she was a third party, or a "legal stranger" to the
child. 10
In In re Interest of Z.J.H.,1" the Wisconsin Supreme Court con-
fronted a custody and visitation dispute between two lesbians.' 2 The
court followed the national trend in this type of case and denied
both visitation and custody rights to the nonadoptive mother despite
evidence that both women had intended to act as the child's mother.
This Note examines the legal rights of nonbiological and nonadop-
tive "parents" in custody and visitation disputes. While special em-
phasis is placed on Wisconsin law, relevant cases and statutes from
other jurisdictions are also discussed. The Note then analyzes the
Z.J.H. decision in light of the development of custody and visitation
rights in Wisconsin. Finally, this Note concludes that the court's
decision was incorrect and that it will have a negative-impact on the
children of same-sex couples in Wisconsin and across the nation.
As one commentator has stated, "[C]ourts may believe that by
granting sole parental rights to the biological mother in a lesbian-
mother family they are discouraging the formation of these families,
but this cause-and-effect relationship does not exist."13 In other
words, the legislatures and courts cannot prevent same-sex couples
from raising children by refusing to develop laws that address the
problems of these nontraditional families.
I. BACKGROUND
This section begins by discussing the concepts of "traditional"
families and "nontraditional" families. It then briefly explains how
custody and visitation disputes arise. Next, this section describes pa-
rental rights and the policy of protecting the "best interests of the
child" and how these two interests sometimes conflict in custody and
visitation disputes. A person petitioning for child custody or visita-
10. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 511.
11. 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991).
12. Id. at 204.
13. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 486.
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tion generally will argue for these rights under the appropriate cus-
tody and visitation statutes. Moreover, there are sometimes other
arguments to be made. When a couple has had the foresight to
make a contract regarding custody and visitation rights in the event
of separation, the petitioner may attempt to enforce the contract.
Also, where the petitioner has relied on her partner's assurances
that both partners are considered to be parents, she may argue for
custody or visitation under a theory of equitable estoppel.
Therefore, the major portion of the Background describes custody
statutes, visitation statutes, contract principles, and the doctrine of
equitable estoppel, 'as related to third-party custody and visitation
rights. Wisconsin cases and statutes are analyzed as well as the rele-
vant law in other jurisdictions.
A. What Is a Family?
1. The Concept of a "Traditional Family"
When attempting to decide who is and who is not a legal parent,
courts seem to be heavily influenced by society's concept of a "tradi-
tional family."1 ' The concept of a traditional family is grounded in
two theories. The first is that a child should have "one mother and
one father, neither more nor less." 15 The second theory is that those
people who are identified as the father and mother should have ex-
clusive possession of the rights and responsibilities associated with
parenthood. 6 In fact, the Supreme Court has decided that the inter-
est of the parent is a constitutionally protected right. 7 This princi-
ple underlies the presumption made by virtually all courts that a
child's best interests will be served by living in the home of a
parent. 8
14. Id. at 468-73.
15. Id. at 468.
16. Id.; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L.
REV. 879, 879 (1984) ("The law recognizes only one set of parents for a child at any one time,
and these parents are autonomous, possessing comprehensive privileges and duties that they share
with no one else.").
17. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). In this case, the Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution required that a natural father be given a hearing
to decide his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him, even though the father
was not married to the children's mother. Id.
18. See 4 LYNN D. WARDLE ET AL.. CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES. POLICY AND
PRACTICE § 39.09 (1988) ("In most states there has long been a presumption that it is in the
child's best interest barring exceptional circumstances, to be in the custody of his or her natural
[Vol. 42:11251128
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These two concepts underlie many court decisions involving cus-
tody and visitation rights. On the one hand, a court faced with the
prospect of a child having more than one mother or father may be
less likely to grant visitation or custody rights to a third party.19 On
the other hand, a court deciding a case where the child is missing
one or both parents may go to great lengths to provide the child
with a mother or a father.2 0 Society's desire to provide children with
a traditional family is often at odds with the desires of third parties
who wish to maintain contact with a child.
Advocates of third-party custody and visitation rights are not lim-
ited to the third parties themselves; they include a wide variety of
commentators. 1 These advocates do not necessarily argue that par-
ents should be deprived of their exclusive rights and responsibili-
ties.22 They do, however, maintain that the courts should re-think
the theory that each child should have only one mother and one
father. 3 In other words, they advocate a more flexible "functional
approach" for defining a family, as opposed to the traditional,
stricter "formal approach." '24
parent(s). This is supported by the constitutionally protected right of the parent to association
with and to determine the upbringing of his or her child.").
19. See, e.g., Klipstein v. Zalewski, 553 A.2d 1384 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988). In Klip-
stein, a seven-year-old child had three father figures in her life: a biological father who visited
once a month, a stepfather who was seeking visitation rights, and her mother's live-in boyfriend.
Id. at 1386. In refusing the stepfather's request for visitation, the court stated: "There must be
some limits on stepparent visitation rights because in our society it is not difficult to conceive of a
child having three, four or even more stepfathers and there are not enough days in a week for the
child to have visitation with all of them." Id.
20. See, e.g., In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 716 (Utah 1990) (granting a stepfather the right to
seek custody of an abandoned child even though the child's mother had left the stepfather before
the child was born); see also MARIANNE TAKAS, CHILD CUSTODY: A COMPLETE GUIDE FOR CON-
CERNED MOTHERS 87 (1987) ("[Judges] would rather see children raised in a traditional home
than in a less traditional one. Particularly if the father is remarried, or has a housekeeper or his
own mother who can provide child care, the judge may be inclined to see the father's new house-
hold as more suitable.").
21. For works by these commentators, see JAMES C. BLACK & DONALD J. CANTOR, CHILD
CUSTODY 68 (1989); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979); Bartlett, supra note 16; Polikoff, supra note 3; Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More
Realistic Definition of "'Family," 26 GONZAGA L. REV. 91 (1990-91); Elizabeth A. Delaney,
Comment, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally Recognizing the Relationship Be-
tween the Nonbiological Lesbian Parent and Her Child, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 177 (1991).
22. See, e.g., Polikoff, supra note 3, at 472 ("For purposes of awarding custody, courts should
retain a distinction between those who fall within the redefinition of parenthood and those who do
not.").
23. See generally Bartlett, supra note 16 (advocating a more flexible definition of family); Poli-
koff, supra note 3 (encouraging the adoption of an expanded definition of "parent" and explaining
how the concept of "traditional family" influences the current definition).
24. See, e.g., Treuthart, supra note 21, at 99. Under a formal approach, a family relationship is
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2. The Current Status of Third Parties in Nontraditional
Families
The visitation and custody rights of third parties in nontraditional
families2 vary considerably according to both the type of situation
considered and the state in which the rights are determined. The
most common types of third parties are grandparents, other rela-
tives, men whose wives have been artificially inseminated, .steppar-
ents, and live-in partners (both heterosexual and homosexual). The
third party whose visitation rights have gained the most acceptance
in state courts and legislatures is the grandparent. 26 The rationale
behind granting grandparent visitation "is that a child's contact
with grandparents will enrich the child's life and give the child the
love and security of an extended family. 27 Some states have used
this rationale to extend the same visitation rights to other relatives.2"
However, the reasoning used to grant such rights to third parties
other than relatives differs in that it is generally based on the par-
defined "according to the model of the traditional nuclear family unless it finds an historical or
statutory basis for expanding this definition to nontraditional forms. This mode of analysis recog-
nizes only individuals related to each other by the bonds of blood, adoption, or marriage." Note,
Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Defini-
tion of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1645 (1991) [hereinafter Looking for a Family Resem-
blance]. Under the functional approach, the court asks "whether a relationship shares the essen-
tial characteristics of a traditionally accepted relationship and fulfills the same human needs.
Thus, the specific characteristics of each relationship, such as economic cooperation, participation
in domestic responsibilities, and affection between the parties, play a crucial role in a functional
determination of family status." Id. at 1646.
25. For the purposes of this Note, a third party is a party who is not the adoptive or biological
parent of the child. A nontraditional family is a family that contains a third party with a parent-
like relationship with the child.
26, Forty states have statutes which grant grandparents visitation rights in the event of a di-
vorce. See Sandra Joan Morris, Grandparents, Uncles, Aunts, Cousins, Friends: How Is the Court
to Decide Which Relationships Will Continue?, 12 FAM. ADVOC. 10, 10 (1989); see also Patricia
Wendlandt, Comment, Grandparent Visitation Statutes: Remaining Problems and the Need for
Uniformity, 67 MARQUETTE L. REV. 730, 739 n.59 (1984) (listing each of the forty state statutes
granting grandparent visitation after divorce). However, the grandparent rights generally extend
only as far as visitation. Grandparents are not on equal footing with legal parents when the issue
is custody. See. e.g., Barstad v. Frazier, 348 N.W.2d 479, 489 (Wis. 1984) (denying grandparents
custody of their grandchildren without proof that the father was unfit). Furthermore, grandparent
visitation rights may terminate when a parent voluntarily relinquishes his rights. See. e.g., In re
Soergel, 453 N.W.2d 624, 628 (Wis. 1990) (denying a paternal grandparent visitation rights after
the natural father had consented to his children's adoption).
27. 2 JEFF ATKINSON. MODERN CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE § 8.12 (1986).
28. See, e.g., In re D.M.M., 404 N.W.2d 530, 537 (Wis. 1987) (granting a great-aunt the right
to petition for visitation under a statute written for grandparents and greatgrandparents).
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ent-like relationship that has developed between the third party and
the child. 9
Husbands who consent to their wives being artificially insemi-
nated generally have all of the legal duties and responsibilities of
fatherhood.3 0 These men are not considered biological parents since
they did not physically father the children, but courts will generally
use a contract theory or equitable estoppel to confer the status of
fatherhood. 3 1 At least one court impliedly used the traditional fam-
ily concept in its analysis by stating that two parents supporting the
child would be preferable to the mother supporting the child alone. 2
The rights and obligations of stepparents vary from state to state.
Many states allow a stepparent to petition for visitation rights.3
Some have even held that a stepparent may petition for custody
rights. 4 Stepparents have a much better chance of obtaining cus-
tody when they have actively participated in bringing up the child
and have regarded the child as one of their own.35 The possibility of
getting custody or visitation rights may decline, however, if both of
the child's natural parents are actively involved in the child's life.3
Thus, if the courts view a stepparent as completing the picture of a
traditional family, the stepparent is more likely to get visitation or
custody rights.
Live-in partners have gained the least ground in third-party cus-
tody and visitation rights. A few courts have granted rights to heter-
osexual cohabitants.37 However, most courts are reluctant to grant
29. See 2 ATKINSON. supra note 27, § 8.07.
30. See. e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (holding a husband who
consented to his wife's artificial insemination liable for child support after divorce); -L.M.S. v.
S.L.S., 312 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) ("We hold that a husband who, because of his
sterile condition, consents to his wife's impregnation, with the understanding that a child will be
created whom they will treat as their own, has the legal duties and responsibilities of fatherhood,
including support.").
31. See, e.g., Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
32. See L.M.S., 312 N.W.2d at 855-56.
33. See, e.g., Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska 1982) (allowing a stepfather to
petition for visitation when he stood in loco parentis to the child); Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64,
68 (Utah 1978) (allowing a stepfather to petition for visitation rights). But see Hughes v. Creigh-
ton, 798 P.2d 403, 406 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a stepfather cannot obtain visitation
rights even if he stands in loco parentis to the child).
34. See, e.g., In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 716 (Utah 1990) (granting a stepfather standing to
seek custody).
35. 2 ATKINSON, supra note 27, § 8.06.
36. See, e.g., Klipstein v. Zalewski, 553 A.2d 1384, 1386 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988)
(refusing to grant stepparent visitation to a stepfather who would be considered the child's "third
father").
37. E.g., Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985 (Alaska 1989). In Buness, the mother's live-in boy-
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these rights.3 8 Even when a court thinks that the live-in partner has
"earned visitation rights," it is generally constrained by the rights of
the natural parent along with the distinct lack of statutory or com-
mon law authority to grant the rights. 9 Homosexual cohabitants
fare even worse.
So far, almost all state appellate courts that have addressed the
situation have refused to grant visitation or custody rights to nonbio-
logical lesbian mothers."' To date, there have been no appellate de-
cisions regarding two homosexual fathers, but there is no reason to
believe that a court would grant them visitation or custody rights
either. Homosexual couples face two major barriers in the courts.
First, because both parents are of the same sex, their situations do
not fit the "traditional family" prototype. Second, many courts do
not look favorably upon homosexual parenting."'
friend cared for her son after the couple separated. Id. at 986. The court found that the welfare of
the child required further proceedings to determine if he should be allowed to live with his nonbio-
logical "father." Id. at 989.
38. E.g., In re Freel, 448 N.W.2d 26, 26 (Iowa 1989) (refusing to grant visitation rights to an
ex-girlfriend even after acknowledging that she was very close to the young boy); Cooper v. Mer-
kel, 470 N.W.2d 253, 255-56 (S.D. 1991) (refusing to grant visitation rights to an ex-boyfriend in
the absence of a showing that the mother was unfit).
39. See Freel, 448 N.W.2d at 27.
40. See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 (Ct. App. 1991) (refusing to extend
the definition of "parent" to include lesbian mothers); Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522
(Ct. App. 1990) (holding that only the legislature could extend visitation rights to lesbian
mothers); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (refusing to extend custody
rights to a lesbian partner); In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991) (denying a nonadoptive
lesbian mother's request for custody and visitation). But see A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 665
(N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a nonbiological lesbian mother had a "colorable claim of
standing to seek enforcement of [custody and visitation] rights"). Also, some courts on the trial
level have granted visitation and custody rights to lesbian mothers. See Gaines-Carter, supra note
8, at A39.
Some nonbiological and nonadoptive lesbian mothers have attempted to adopt their partners'
children. In general, however, adoption statutes are not available for "the purpose of extending
legal parental status to a lesbian partner in a same-sex relationship." Delaney, supra note 21, at
213; see Shaista-Parveen Ali, Comment, Homosexual Parenting: Child Custody and Adoption,
22 .U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1009, 1034-35 (1989) (discussing the concept of "second parent" adop-
tions). In fact, two states' statutes explicitly prevent adoption by homosexuals. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1990). A New York court
recently held, however, that the New York adoption statute allows adoption by the nonadoptive or
nonbiological lesbian mother. See In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur. Ct. 1992).
41. See Developments in the Law. Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508,
1637 (1989). This article explains that there are five rationales frequently used to deny or restrict
custody or visitation by gay or lesbian parents. They are: (I) fear that the child will be "harassed
or ostracized"; (2) fear that the child will become homosexual; (3) a belief that the child's moral
well-being will be harmed; (4) concern that the child may be sexually molested; and (5) the fact
that state sodomy statutes show that the state has an interest in preventing homosexuality. Id.; see
also Jeff Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18
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B. How Custody and Visitation Disputes Arise
The majority of all custody and visitation disputes arise when a
marriage ends.42 However, custody questions also arise in contexts
such as guardianship law, juvenile court and neglect laws, and laws
relevant to terminating parental rights to free a child for adoption."'
Although homosexuals may have trouble getting or retaining cus-
tody in any one of these contexts, this Note examines only their
rights after the relationship dissolves.
Most custody decisions are made not by judges but by the parties
and their attorneys, sometimes with the help of psychiatric profes-
sionals or court personnel."4 It is only after the parties have ex-
hausted all negotiation possibilities that they are forced to turn to
the legal system to make the custody or visitation decision for them.
Couples often are faced with decisions regarding child support,
maintenance, division of assets, and insurance protection. These
decisions may complicate the negotiation process by becoming bar-
gaining points that affect the parties' decisions regarding visitation
and custody demands. 6
C. Competing Interests
There are two major competing interests in visitation and custody
disputes involving third parties: 1) the custodial rights of the natural
(biological or adoptive) parent and 2) the best interests of the child.
"Both the right of a parent to custody and the liberty interest of
parents and children to relate to one another in the context of the
family, free from governmental interference, are fundamental rights
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth -Amendment
FAM. L.Q. 1, 33 (1984) (stating that not all, but many, courts seem more willing to assume harm
from a homosexual relationship than a heterosexual one); Ali, supra note 40, at 1013-21 (discuss-
ing "common preconceptions" regarding homosexual parenting); Judith A. Lintz, Note, The Op-
portunities, or Lack Thereof, for Homosexual Adults to Adopt Children, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV.
471, 487-93 (1991) (discussing several of the arguments commonly stated by courts opposed to
homosexual parenting).
42. 4 WARDLE ET AL.. supra note 18, § 39.01.
43. 4 id.
44. BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 21, at 33; see also Lois WEITHORN, PSYCHOLOGY AND
CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATION: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES AND EXPERTISE 62 (1987) ("[Tlhe typical
child custody case is not contested. Of the child custody cases resulting from parental divorce,
83 % to 90 % have been estimated to be uncontested as a result of parental agreements concerning
custody arrangements before the custody hearing.").
45. See BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 21, at 32.
46. Id.
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to the United States Constitution. 4 7 Virtually all courts accept this
proposition.48 These same courts, however, along with many com-
mentators, recognize that the best interests of the child are also an
extremely important consideration.49 The modern trend seems to
favor the best interests of the child over parental rights when the
two directly conflict.5
The best interests analysis varies from state to state, but most
courts consider a variety of factors, which can be divided into four
categories: 1) the age and gender of the parents and of the child; 2)
the physical and material needs of the child; 3) the moral, religious,
philosophical, and intellectual needs of the child; and 4) the physi-
cal, moral, and material position of the parents, along with their
desire and capacity to respond to the child's needs. 1 Best interest
standards are often "ambiguous and indeterminate"; however, they
generally afford courts some flexibility in their evaluations. 2
Wisconsin has experienced the conflict between parental rights
and the best interests test, as have most other states.53 In Ponsford
v. Crute,54 the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted custody of a child
47. Paquette v. Paquette, 499 A.2d 23, 29-30 (Vt. 1985) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 753 (1982)).
48. See, e.g., Hughes v. Creighton, 798 P.2d 403, 406 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); White v. Thomp-
son, 569 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Miss. 1990); Pierce v. Pierce, 645 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Mont. 1982).
49. See Hughes, 798 P.2d at 406. See generally GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 21 (advocating
the use of the best interests of the child standard as the main criterion in custody and visitation
disputes).
50. E.g., Paquette, 499 A.2d at 27. In Paquette, the court held that a stepparent who stands in
loco parentis to a stepchild may obtain custody under "extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 30;
see also BLACK & CANTOR. supra note 21, at 68 ("[C]hildren have the right to be reared in the
most healthful alternative available and society has an interest in the healthful rearing of its
minor citizens. These considerations must precede parental desires.").
51. 4 WARDLE ET AL., supra note 18, § 39.06. Under Wisconsin law, the court may consider
(but is not limited to) the following factors: 1) the wishes of the child's legal parents; 2) the
wishes of the child; 3) the relationship of the child with his parents and/or siblings; 4) the child's
adjustment to school, home, religion, and community; 5) the mental and physical health of the
child and the parents; 6) the availability of child care services; 7) whether one party is likely to
interfere with the other party's relationship with the child; 8) whether there is any evidence of
child abuse; 9) whether there is evidence of spousal abuse; 10) whether either party has a drug or
alcohol problem; and 11) other factors that the judge deems relevant. WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.24(5)(a-k) (West Supp. 1992).
52. 4 WARDLE ET AL., supra note 18, § 39.06.
53. This Note analyzes Wisconsin law because the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied heavily on
the state's statutes and case law in deciding In re Z.J.H. The Z.J.H. case was chosen for this Note
because it provides a thorough analysis of a lesbian partner's rights under custody law, visitation
law, contract law, and equitable estoppel principles. While it is not the first state court decision
regarding custody and visitation rights in the context of same-sex couples, it is the most compre-
hensive and detailed.
54. 202 N.W.2d 5 (Wis. 1972).
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to her biological father even though the child had lived with her
maternal grandparents for several years. 5 The court held that a
natural parent cannot be deprived custody of his child unless he is
unfit or unable to care for the child.56 The court defined neither
"unfit" nor "unable," but it is generally recognized that this re-
quirement is extremely difficult to prove.
Just shortly more than two years later, however, that same court
warned that Ponsford should not be interpreted as providing an "in-
flexible rule" that the doctrine of the best interests of the child can
never prevail over parental rights. 8 In Mawhinney v. Mawhinney,
the court stated that "[a]s a general matter, but not invariably, the
child's best interest will be served by living in a parent's home.
However, if circumstances compel a contrary conclusion, the inter-
ests of the child, not a supposed right of even a fit parent to have
custody, should control."15 9 The court reversed and remanded the de-
cision, 'Concluding that the best interests of the child was an element
which should have been considered by the trial court in its determi-
nation."0 These two cases reflect the difficulty a court may have
when deciding between the two competing interests.
Third parties attempting to get custody and visitation rights use a
variety of methods, some more successful than others. Many try to
work within a state's custody and visitation statutes. Couples with
the foresight to sign parenting agreements may attempt to enforce
those agreements. Finally, the third parties may rely on principles of
equitable estoppel.
55. Id. at 7-8.
56. Id. at 8.
57. TAKAS, supra note 20, at 87; see 2 ATKINSON, supra note 27, § 8.03.
Examples of conduct or conditions giving rise to findings of unfitness and resulting in
third party custody include: commission of felonies, child abuse, drug abuse, alcohol
abuse (usually including driving while intoxicated), and severe mental illness. Other
conduct or conditions, while perhaps not so egregious as to result in a finding of unfit-
ness, but which nevertheless have resulted in custody being given to a third party have
included: hitting a child with a belt, harsh spanking, lack of attention to a child's
health care, physical inability to care for a child, child snatching, and mental instabil-
ity with threats of suicide.
2 id.
58. Mawhinney v. Mawhinney, 225 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Wis. 1975).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 504. The court distinguished Ponsford on several bases, including the age of the
children, the behavior of the father, and whether the child wished to remain with the grandpar-





The standard generally applied by courts in custody disputes be-
tween two parents (or any two people who have standing as parents)
is the "best interests of the child standard."'" This standard pro-
vides that custody will be granted to the parent who will more likely
satisfy the best interests requirements of the child.62 If a third party
seeking custody rights is able to achieve standing as a "parent," he
or she may be granted custody if the court determines that this is in
the best interests of the child. However, it is difficult to achieve this
standing since most states have custody statutes that embody the
"parental preference" standard."3 This standard allows only biologi-
cal or adoptive parents to have standing to petition for custody of a
child unless these parents are declared to be unfit or they consent to
the third party having custody."'
There are a few cases throughout the country in which the courts
have conferred the status of a parent on third parties for the pur-
pose of achieving custody standing."e In one such case, Buness v.
Gillen,6 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a man who lived with
the natural mother of a child, but who had never been married to
her, had standing to seek custody of the child.6 7 The court found
that the child had developed a strong emotional bond with his
61. 4 WARDLE ET AL., supra note 18, § 39.06.
62. For a discussion of the best interests test, see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
63. See 2 ATKINSON, supra note 27, § 8.01.
64. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.500 (1987) ("Before the court makes an order awarding
custody to any person other than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it shall make a
finding that an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child. ... ). But see
OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (1991) (granting custody standing to "any person including but not
limited to a foster parent, stepparent, grandparent or relative by blood or marriage" (emphasis
added)). For a critique of the parental preference standard, see Eric P. Salthe, Note, Would
Abolishing the Natural Parent Preference in Custody Disputes Be in Everyone's Best Interest?,
29 J. FAM. L. 539 (1991).
65. The rationale behind these decisions was phrased well by the Utah Supreme Court in In re
J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 714 (Utah 1990). The court stated:
It may be that no one has the same rights toward a child as his or her parents.
However, the fact that a person is not a child's natural or legal parent does not mean
that he or she must stand as a total stranger to the child where custody is concerned.
Certain people, because of their relationship to a child, are at least entitled to stand-
ing to seek a determination as to whether it would be in the best interests of the child
for them to have custody,
Id.
66. 781 P.2d 985 (Alaska 1989).
67. Id. at 988.
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nonbiological "parent" and gave great weight to the fact that this
"parent" had been the child's primary caregiver and father figure.6 8
The Buness court used a concept called psychological parentage.69
The concept was first developed in Carter v. Brodrick,70 where the
court decided that a stepparent who had earned the status of "psy-
chological parent" had standing to obtain visitation rights. 71 The
Carter court reasoned that the concept of a psychological parent
was grounded in the common law doctrine of in loco parentis. The
court explained the in loco parentis doctrine as follows:
"The term 'in loco parentis' means in the place of a parent, and a 'person in
loco parentis' is one who has assumed the status and obligations of a parent
without formal adoption. Whether or not one assumes this status depends on
whether that person intends to assume that obligation.
'Where one stands in loco parentis to another, the rights and liabilities
arising out of that relation are, as the words imply, exactly the same as
between parent and child.' "72
The in loco parentis doctrine has been used by third parties to
obtain standing under both custody and visitation statutes.73 The
benefit of using the doctrine in disputes involving third parties is
that it places no arbitrary limit on the gender or number of persons
who seek custody rights.74 It has a drawback, however, in that it
does not require any intent on the part of the legal parent. 7' Thus, a
third party could obtain standing even though the legal parent never
intended that party to assume parental obligations. 76
68. Id. at 989.
69. Id. at 988.
70. 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982).
71. Id. at 855.
72. Id. at 853 (quoting Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1978) (footnotes omitted)).
73. See Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1978) (holding that a stepfather who had
lived with a mother and her child for about four years was entitled to a hearing on the issue of
visitation rights on the basis of in loco parentis); Paquette v. Paquette, 499 A.2d 23, 30 (Vt.
1985) (interpreting "child of the marriage" to include stepchildren if an in loco parentis relation-
ship had existed and the mother was unfit or if there were extraordinary circumstances). But see
Pierce v. Pierce, 645 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Mont. 1982) (holding that a stepfather had no standing to
contest custody in a dispute with the natural mother even though both parties testified that they
intended for the stepfather to adopt the child).
74. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 507.
75. Id.
76. An example of a situation where the legal parent did not have this intent might be where
the parent has hired a live-in babysitter for her children. The parent undoubtedly would intend for
the babysitter to have many parental obligations but would not intend for the babysitter to have





The relevant portion of Wisconsin's custody statute reads as
follows:
(3) Custody to agency or relative. (a) If the interest of any child demands it,
and if the court finds that neither parent is able to care for the child ade-
quately or that neither parent is fit and proper to have the care and custody
of the child, the court may declare the child to be in need of protection or
services and transfer legal custody of the child to a relative of the child
77
In the previous version of section 3(a) of the statute, the word
"party" stood in the place of the word "parent." 7 Unfortunately,
the legislature gave no specific reason for changing the terminology.
The change in wording is relevant in that it can be argued that the
legislature was attempting to emphasize that only biological and
adoptive parents have superior rights when custody is at issue.
The custody statute was interpreted by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Barstad v. Frazier.79 This case involved a custody dispute
between the natural mother and the maternal grandparent of the
child.8" In awarding custody to the mother, the court held that "in
custody disputes between parents and third parties . . . a parent is
entitled to custody of his or her children unless the parent is either
unfit or unable to care for the children or there are compelling rea-
sons for awarding custody to a third party."8 The majority stated
that "[c]ompelling reasons include abandonment, persistent neglect
of parental responsibilities, extended disruption of parental custody,
or other similar extraordinary circumstances that would drastically
affect the welfare of the child."82 The court recognized that it was
balancing the best interests of the child and the rights of the natural
parent 3 and developed this rule after analyzing several cases from
other jurisdictions, as well as the relevant cases in Wisconsin.8 '
77. WIS. STAT. ANN, § 767.24(3)(a) (West Supp. 1992).
78. Id. § 767.24(l)(c) (West 1981), amended by Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(3)(a) (West Supp.
1992).
79. 348 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1984).
80. Id. at 481.
81. Id. at 489.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see Mawhinney v. Mawhinney, 225 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Wis. 1975) (deciding that the
best interests of the child can prevail over the custody rights of a fit parent); Ponsford v. Crute,
202 N.W.2d 5, 8 (Wis. 1972) (holding that a father could not be deprived of visitation with his
child unless he was unfit or unable to care for the child).
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The standard for determining third-party custody rights in Wis-
consin has remained unchallenged since the court's decision in Bar-




Visitation statutes vary greatly from state to state, but the major-
ity of states allows third-party visitation rights in one form or an-
other.8 5 When faced with an ambiguous statute, most courts are
willing to extend the third-party rights to steprelatives of the child.8 6
They have been reluctant, however, to extend the same rights to
third parties who are not related to the child or the child's parent by
marriage. 7 A majority of the states gives the courts more leeway in
disputes over visitation rights than is granted in disputes over cus-
tody."8 As a result, third parties may find it easier to obtain visita-
tion rights than custody rights. 89 Wisconsin is one of several states
that has made a concerted effort to provide third parties with visita-
tion rights.
2. In Wisconsin
Grandparent visitation rights were the first type of third-party
85. See supra notes 25-41 and accompanying text (discussing the current status of third-party
custody and visitation rights).
86. See Ray v. Ray, 407 S.E.2d 592, 593 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing a stepgrandmother to
petition for visitation); Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879, 883 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (using the in loco
parentis doctrine to allow a stepparent to have visitation rights).
87. See, e.g., Hughes v. Creighton, 798 P.2d 403, 404 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (refusing to allow
a live-in boyfriend who believed he was the natural father to have visitation rights); In re Freel,
448 N.W.2d 26, 26 (Iowa 1989) (refusing to grant a woman visitation even though she had lived
with the young child for five years and the court strongly felt that visitation should take place);
Cooper v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d 253, 256 (S.D. 1991) (holding that a live-in boyfriend of seven
years did not have standing to sue for visitation).
88. See Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978) ("[T]here is greater flexibility in
determining visitation [rights] than there is in determining custody."). But see Cooper, 470
N.W.2d at 255-56 (using the same standard for visitation as was used for custody - "a clear
showing against the parent of gross misconduct, unfitness or other extraordinary circumstances
affecting the welfare of the child").
89. Custody gives the custodial party the legal authority to make important decisions for a
child in matters such as health, education, and religion. BLACK & CANTOR, supia note 21, at 22.
Visitation rights do not include these decisionmaking powers. Thus, when a court grants visitation
to a third party, it is not infringing on the rights of the natural parents to the extent it would be if
it granted custody to the third party. Id.
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visitation rights officially recognized in Wisconsin. These rights were
granted by the supreme court in Ponsford v. Crute9" and Weichman
v. Weichman.9' The court was not bothered by the fact that the
existing statute did not explicitly give these rights to grandparents:
There is no statutory or commonlaw rule which forbids a court in a divorce
action from granting visitation rights to parents or to others. The question is
not one of the power of the court but of judgment or of judicial discretion.
The underlying principle or guideline for the granting of visitation privi-
leges, as it is for granting custody, is what is for the best interest and wel-
fare of the child.
92
In 1977, the legislature followed the court's lead and enacted a
statute expressly granting grandparent and greatgrandparent
rights.93 After this statute was enacted, the supreme court decided
that the legislature intended to include relatives other than grand-
parents and greatgrandparents.94  The court's opinion in In re
D.M.M.95 is interesting because of its discussion of the definition of
the word "parent" under the statute governing parental visitation
rights.96 The court examined the possibility that the definition of
"parent" might include a person in loco parentis.97 The court also
mentioned, however, that the definition could be restricted to mean
"natural parent."9 8 Ultimately, it did not decide this issue and ex-
amined the legislature's intent instead.99 The court found that
"[tihe grandparent language . . . was a codification of case law to
further protect grandparent and greatgrandparents' rights and was
not meant thereby to exclude other relatives." 100 It remanded the
case to the trial court for determination of whether visitation would
be in the best interest of the child. 10'
Shortly after the decision in D.M.M., the Wisconsin legislature
took the court's reasoning a step further and enacted its present
90. 202 N.W.2d 5 (Wis. 1972).
91. 184 N.W.2d 882 (Wis. 1971).
92. Id. at 884 (citation omitted).
93. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(4) (West 1981), amended by WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.245
(West Supp. 1992).
94. See In re D.M.M., 404 N.W.2d 530, 536 (Wis. 1987) (allowing a child's great-aunt to
petition for visitation rights).
95. 404 N.W.2d 530 (Wis. 1987).
96. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(1) (West 1981 & Supp. 1992).
97. DM.M., 404 N.W.2d at 534.
98. Id. at 535.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 536.
101. Id. at 537.
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third-party visitation statute:
(1) Upon petition by a grandparent, greatgrandparent, stepparent or person
who has maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with
the child, the -court may grant reasonable visitation rights to that person if
the parents have notice of the hearing and if the court determines that visi-
tation is in the best interest of the child.
(2) Whenever possible, in making a determination under sub. (1), the court
shall consider the wishes of the child.
10 2
While the previous statute reflected only the legislature's approval
of the decision to give grandparents and greatgrandparents visita-
tion rights,0 3 the current statute reflects the legislature's concern
that the previous statute failed to "recognize the importance to the
child of continuing contact with stepparents and persons with whom
the child has lived in a relationship similar to a parent-child
relationship."''1 4
The next relevant visitation decision was issued by the Wisconsin
Appellate Court in Van Cleve v. Hemminger.0 5 In that case, a
grandmother sought visitation rights from the court even though the
child's natural parents were still married.' The court construed the
visitation statute to apply only in cases where "an underlying action
affecting the family unit has previously been filed."' 1 The court
cited public policy reasons for its decision:
It is appropriate for the state to protect the children's best interests by or-
dering visitation with appropriate adults to mitigate the trauma and impact
of a dissolving family relationship. In the absence of such factors, however,
there is no justifiable reason for the state to override determinations made
by parents as to what is in the best interests of their children."0 8
Since the child was not experiencing the trauma of a family in dis-
solution, the court was in favor of preserving parental rights and
denied the grandmother's claim. 0 9
The court's most recent decision concerning visitation rights oc-
102. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992).
103. In re Soergel, 453 N.W.2d 624, 626 (Wis. 1990).
104. Comments to 1987 Act 355, WIs. STAT. ANN. (West 1981 & Supp. 1992). The legislature
did not specifically indicate what it meant by "parent-child relationship," and the Wisconsin
courts have not yet addressed this issue.
105. 415 N.W.2d 571 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
106. Id. at 572.
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curred in In re Soergel.110 In Soergel, paternal grandparents peti-
tioned for visitation rights after their son allowed the child's stepfa-
ther to adopt their grandson."' The court held that the adoption
severed the rights of the family related to the child's biological fa-
ther."1 2 It stated that the natural mother and adoptive father had
the right to determine what was in the best interest of their child.1 13
In general, it is almost impossible for a third party to gain stand-
ing in a custody dispute in Wisconsin and in most other jurisdic-
tions. A third party seeking visitation rights may face more lenient
standards, but the visitation laws often favor some third parties (i.e.,
blood relatives) over others (i.e., live-in partners). Many couples in
nontraditional families realize their rights are not fully defined
within the law. Some of these couples attempt to define their inten-
tions and to preserve their rights by creating and signing coparent-
ing agreements.
E. Contracts Involving Custody and Visitation Rights
1. In General
Although the right to contract is well-recognized, 1 4 "it is axio-
matic that a mother cannot bargain away the best interest of the
child.""' 5 This is because the state has an interest in minor children
that is superior even to parental rights. 1 No legislature or court
has disputed these principles. Many courts, however, will not auto-
matically declare a visitation or custody contract null and void." 7 In
fact, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states the current rule
as follows: "A promise affecting the right of custody of a minor
child is unenforceable on grounds of public policy unless the disposi-
tion as to custody is consistent with the best interest of the child."" 18
110. 453 N.W.2d 624 (Wis. 1990).
111. Id. at 625.
112. Id. at 627.
113. Id. at 628. In 1992, The Wisconsin Supreme Court decided that when the natural father
has died (as opposed to wilfully terminating his parental rights as the father in Soergel did), the
grandparents can petition for visitation. In re C.G.F., 483 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Wis. 1992).
114. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that freedom to contract is
embodied in the concept of liberty in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
115. Klipstein v. Zalewski, 553 A.2d 1384, 1389 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988).
116. 15 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 1744A (3d ed. 1972).
117. 15 id. ("[T]here is a steadily increasing line of cases clearly indicative of a trend to sus-
tain the bargain when it is to the advantage of the child.").
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 191 (1981). The same philosophy holds true
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This rule is also applicable to contracts affecting visitation rights."'
For example, in In re John Doe, 2 ' a New Mexico appellate court
evaluated a contract in which the natural mother agreed to leave
her son in the custody of her former husband but retained her pa-
rental visitation rights.' A dispute between the mother and her
former husband arose when the mother tried to regain custody of
the child.' 2 The court did not void the contract when it decided to
terminate the mother's rights; instead, it declared that contracts
"regarding the guardianship, care, custody, maintenance or educa-
tion of children are subject to judicial modification.' 23
Thus, while some courts may still strike down a custody or visita-
tion contract as being against public policy per se, others may de-
cide to modify it only to the extent necessary to satisfy the best
interests test.
2. In Wisconsin
In 1931, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was faced with a visita-
tion rights contract in Stickles v. Reichardt.'24 In that case, a father
agreed to let a couple adopt his three-year-old son in exchange for
their promise to allow him to continue to visit the boy.' 2 ' After the
adoption was final, the couple refused to allow the natural father to
visit his son.' 26 In its opinion, the court first mentioned that it was
against public policy for a parent to permanently transfer custody of
for settlement agreements: "[T]he law provides that [parental agreements concerning custody ar-
rangements] will determine the child's custody if the court concludes that the best interests of
[the] child will be promoted by fulfillment of its terms." WEITHORN, supra note 44, at 85. It also
applies to prenuptial agreements. STANLEY PLESENT, PREPARING MATRIMONIAL AGREEMENTS 34
(1989). Plesent states;
Agreements between the parents regarding custody and visitation questions are bene-
ficial in order to avoid a wrenching contest that embroils the children in an emotional
situation. No court, however, will relinquish its absolute discretion to determine
whether a particular custody and visitation arrangement is in the best interest of the
child.
Id.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 191 cmt. a (1981).
120. 648 P.2d 798 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).
121. Id. at 800.
122. Id. at 801.
123. Id. at 804. But see Street v. Hubert, 491 N.E.2d 29, 32 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (refusing to
enforce an oral agreement allowing a natural mother to have visitation rights after the adoption).
124. 234 N.W. 728 (Wis. 1931).
125. Id. at 729.
126. Id.
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his or her child to another.' 27 It then acknowledged that the con-
tract would not permanently transfer custody rights back to the nat-
ural father but that it might intrude upon the adoptive parents'
right to custody. 128 The court expressed concern that the contract
might "greatly impair the new parent-child relationship with very
undesirable consequences to the child."' 29 Even though the court
found the natural father's plight emotionally appealing, it refused to
grant him visitation rights.' 30
In reality, it was the court's concern for the interests of the child
that motivated its decision not to enforce the contract. The court
ended its opinion by stating:
A great deal of the confusion which exists in the cases arises from the fact
that there has been a failure to distinguish between the validity of a contract
as such and the consequences to the child which have arisen by reason of the
making of the contract. In determining the matters having to do with cus-
tody of children, the primary question is, What is for the best interest of the
child? ...In many cases language is used which indicates that the court's
conclusion is based upon the contractual rights of the parties as such, but in
reality that is only one factor in a number of factors which leads the court
to the conclusion that the best interests of the child require its custody to be
left where the contract placed it."'
With this language, the court in Stickles clearly indicated that the
best interests of the child is the overriding concern when evaluating
a custody or visitation agreement.
Almost seventy years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court gave
further insight into its approach to contract analysis in Watts v.
Watts.'32 In that case, the court was faced with a property agree-
ment between unmarried cohabitants. 33 The court first stressed that
the freedom to contract is an important right worthy of judicial pro-
tection. 3"' It then addressed the defendant's claims that the contract
was void for public policy reasons.' 3  The court decided that the





132. 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987).
133. Id. at 309.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 309-10. The defendant had three theories underlying his public policy argument.
First, he claimed that enforcement of the agreement would contravene Wisconsin's Family Code.
Id. at 310. Next, he asserted that the legislature was the body responsible for determining prop-
erty rights of unmarried couples. Id. Finally, he claimed that the court's recognition of the con-
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plaintiff had a valid contract claim and explained that a declaration
that a "contract is against public policy should be made only after a
careful balancing, in the light of all the circumstances, of the inter-
est in enforcing a particular promise against the policy against
enforcement."' 36
Through Stickles and Watts, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
showed its reluctance to automatically declare a contract void for
public policy reasons. In Stickles, the court considered the contract
in light of the best interests of the child,' 37 and in Watts, it balanced
contractual rights against public policy.' 38 These cases imply that
the court adopted the flexible approach espoused in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and adopted by a number of other states. 39
F. Equitable Estoppel
1. In General
When statutory and contractual principles fail to establish third-
party rights, courts may be willing to extend custody and visitation
rights using the principle of equitable estoppel. The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts explains the equitable estoppel doctrine as
follows: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."110
The appearance of the principle of equitable estoppel as applied
to the status of parents first occurred in the context of child support
disputes. The doctrine operated to enforce a child support obligation
upon a party who had acted as a parent to a child. It has been used
in the context of stepfathers,"4' husbands of women who have been
tract would signal approval of an immoral and illegal relationship. Id.
136. Id. at 309-10.
137. 234 N.W. 728, 730 (Wis. 1931).
138. 405 N.W.2d at 309-13.
139. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing the approach taken by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981).
141. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 357-58 (N.J. 1984) ("[Il]n appropriate cases, a
permanent support obligation may be imposed on a stepparent on the basis of equitable estoppel
.... "). But see In re Holcomb, 471 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (holding that neither
equitable estoppel nor in loco parentis could be used to force a stepfather to pay child support).
1993] 1145
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artificially inseminated, ' 4  and same-sex couples. 141
Once the courts began to use the equitable estoppel doctrine for
child support enforcement, they realized that it was only fair to use
the principle to recognize the nonbiological parent's corresponding
right to visitation. 44 Thus, the doctrine has been used to grant visi-
tation rights, 45 as well as to create the status of "equitable
parent.'
In the visitation and custody context, the doctrine basically works
to prevent a natural mother from denying that her ex-husband is the
father of her child. In Atkinson v. Atkinson,1 41 a mother claimed
that her ex-husband was not the biological father of her son and
attempted to deny him custody and visitation rights.14 8 The court
explained that even if a husband is not the biological father of a
child, he may still have standing as an "equitable parent" under the
custody and visitation statutes. 4 9 It found that when a child is born
or conceived during a marriage, the mother's husband may be con-
sidered an equitable parent when:
(1) the husband and the child mutually acknowledge a relationship as father
and child, or the mother of the child has cooperated in the development of
such a relationship over a period of time prior to the filing of the complaint
for divorce, (2) the husband desires to have the rights afforded to a parent,
and (3) the husband is willing to take on the responsibility of paying child
142. See, e.g., Wener v. Wener, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (App. Div. 1970) (holding a husband
liable for child support after he consented to adopt a child); Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406,
412 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (holding a husband liable for child support after he consented to his wife's
artificial insemination).
143. See Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fam. Ct. 1985). In this case, a woman
(Michael) living as a transsexual, lived as "husband and wife" with another woman (Karin). Id.
at 781. Karin had two children by artificial insemination, and Michael agreed to waive any right
she had to disclaim the children as her own. Id. at 781-82. Later, when the couple separated,
Michael tried to avoid her child support obligations. Id. The court used equitable estoppel to
enforce the obligations. Id. at 784.
144. See Klipstein v. Zalewski, 553 A.2d 1384, 1387 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988) ("[Ilt
can fairly be argued that the obligation to support and the right to visitation are correlative and
the two legal tenets should be applied in pari materia.").
145. See In re D.L.J. and R.R.J., 469 N.W.2d 877, 881. (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a
husband was the equitable parent of his wife's child and was therefore entitled to reasonable
visitation).
146. See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a
husband had standing for custody and visitation where both the husband and the child considered
their relationship to be a father-son relationship and where the mother had cooperated in develop-
ing that relationship).
147. 408 N.W.2d 516 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
148. Id. at 517.
149. Id. at 519.
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support.'
The court held that the father was entitled to be treated as a natu-
ral father under the "equitable parent" doctrine and remanded the
case for re-evaluation of his custody and visitation rights.151
One benefit of the equitable estoppel doctrine is that it focuses on
the intent of the legally recognized parent. 152 The doctrine is defi-
cient, however, in that it allows only specific relief.515 In other
words, the court's holding is effective only for the specific issue at
hand. If another dispute concerning the child should arise, another
trial would be necessary. 154 This result would be undesirable since
"the court process for determining custody can be extremely hard
both on children and on parents."1 55
2. In Wisconsin
Wisconsin courts have made use of the equitable estoppel doctrine
both to impose the obligation of child support' and to prevent a
mother from asserting that her ex-husband was not the father of her
child. 57 In In re D.L.H.,158 a mother requested that her ex-husband
be dismissed from a paternity action after blood tests determined
that he was not the father of the child.' 59 The ex-husband knew that
he might not be the father but claimed that he had relied on his ex-
wife's representations in not filing for adoption.1 6 0 The Wisconsin
150. Id.
151. Id. at 520.
152. See Polikoff, supra note 3, at 501.
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., In re D.L.H., 419 N.W.2d 283, 287 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (refusing to address
whether the equitable parent doctrine "operates to elevate the husband in a divorce proceeding
from third-party status to a natural parent").
155. TAKAS, supra note 20, at 128. Takas states that "children often feel anxious, caught in the
middle, unsure of their future. Even afterward, they may feel worried and even guilty about their
role in the conflict." Id. at 129.
156. See In re L.M.S. & S.L.S., 312 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (upholding a
child support decree against a husband who consented to his wife's artificial insemination); see
also In re A.J.N. & J.M.N., 414 N.W.2d 68, 71 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding the doctrine in
a stepfather setting but deciding that it did not apply on this set of facts).
157. See In re D.L.J. & R.R.J., 469 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (holding a mother
estopped from seeking a declaration, during proceedings, that her husband was not her child's
natural parent); In re D.L.H., 419 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that principles
of equitable estoppel could be used to prevent a mother from instituting paternity proceedings
against her husband).
158. 419 N.W.2d 283 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
159. Id. at 284.
160. Id. at 287.
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Appellate Court held that the ex-husband could use equitable estop-
pel to prevent the mother from questioning his paternity if the trial
court found that he did in fact rely on representations made by the
mother. 161
Almost four years later, in In re D.L.J. and R.R.J.,62 the appel-
late court again used the equitable estoppel doctrine to prevent a
mother from withholding visitation rights from her ex-husband. 163
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not ruled on the use of the equi-
table estoppel doctrine in the context of unmarried, heterosexual
couples.
With its willingness to extend visitation rights to grandparents
and other relatives, its insightful approach to custody and visitation
agreements, and its flexible use of the equitable estoppel doctrine,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court appeared to be willing to extend some
rights to nonbiological and nonadoptive lesbian mothers. However,
when the first lesbian custody and visitation dispute was presented
to the court in In re Z.J.H.,"6 the court demonstrated its unwilling-
ness to do so.
II. SUBJECT OPINION
In In re Z.J.H.,6 5 the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied Wiscon-
sin statutes and case law to a custody and visitation dispute between
two women who had at one time decided they wanted to raise a
child together. The court analyzed the state custody statute, the vis-
itation statute, contract law, and the principles of equitable estoppel
and decided that the nonbiological mother was entitled to neither
custody nor visitation rights.
A. Facts and Procedure
Wendy Sporleder and Janice Hermes lived together for approxi-
mately eight years.' 6 They decided to have a child together and
first attempted to accomplish a pregnancy through the artificial in-
semination of Sporleder.1 7 When this attempt failed, the couple de-
161. Id. at 286-87.
162. 469 N.W.2d 877 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
163. Id. at 881.
164. 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 204.
167. Id.
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cided that Hermes would adopt a child.""8 The child, Z.J.H., was
born on January 19, 198869 and was placed in their home in March
of that year.' 7 ' Hermes worked outside of the home, and Sporleder
assumed the duties of primary caretaker of the child at home.17
In October 1988, the couple separated.172 Later that month, they
signed a coparenting contract providing that in the event of separa-
tion, the two women would use mediation to determine the physical
placement of their child.' 7' It also stated that the party who did not
have possession would have reasonable and liberal visitation rights
to the child. 174 Hermes's adoption of Z.J.H. was formalized in No-
vember, 1988, and Hermes proceeded to prohibit Sporleder, the pri-
mary caregiver, from visiting the child. 75
In March of 1989, one year after the baby was placed with the
couple, Sporleder brought. an action in the family court in
Outagamie County, Wisconsin. 76 She sought physical custody of
Z.J.H or visitation rights along with enforcement of the coparenting
agreement. 77 The family court commissioner granted the request
for visitation rights but declined to decide the other issues.' 78
The circuit court reversed the commissioner's finding, granting
summary judgment for Hermes on three grounds: 1) Sporleder did
not have legal standing as a parent; 2) the agreement was void as
against public policy; and 3) Hermes was not equitably estopped
from denying that Sporleder was a parent of the child.'7 9 The appel-
late court affirmed the decision of the circuit court.'80
The appellate court first relied on wording from Ponsford v.
Crute '8 and Barstad v. Frazier'12 and decided that only a natural
168. Id.
169. In re Z.J.H., 459 N.W.2d 602, 603 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990), affid, 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis.
1991).
170. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 204.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 204 & n.2.






180. In re Z.J.H., 459 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990), affld, 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis.
1991).
181. 202 N.W.2d 5 (Wis. 1972).
182. 348 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1984).
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parent has standing under Wisconsin custody law. 183 In Ponsford,
the supreme court held that a biological or adoptive'parent cannot
be deprived of custody unless she is proved to be unfit or unable to
care for her child.""' In Barstad, the court basically reiterated its
holding in Ponsford and added that "compelling circumstances"
may also serve to deprive a natural parent of custody." 5
The appellate court in Z.J.H. held that a nonbiological parent
may not petition for custody "even when that person has established
a close parent-like relationship with the child." ' 6 Turning to the
coparenting agreement, the court found that the legislature had de-
cided custody and visitation rights and that a contract could not
change a statutory scheme. 8 7 Finally, the court recalled the reason-
ing in Soergel,18 which held that the visitation statute cannot be
used to provide third parties with visitation rights where the family
unit is intact."8 9 The appellate court stated that "[t]he fact that
Hermes is a single 'natural' parent by virtue of solo adoption in no
way diminishes the intact nature of her family unit."1 90
B. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's Opinion
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's
opinion and denied both custody and visitation rights to
Sporleder. 9 The court held that: 1) Sporleder did not have stand-
ing to obtain custody rights; 2) she was not entitled to visitation
rights because there was no underlying action affecting the family;
3) the coparenting agreement was unenforceable; and 4) Hermes
was not equitably estopped from withholding custody and visitation
from Sporleder. 92
1. The Custody Statute
The Wisconsin Supreme Court used several different rationales to
183. Z.J.H., 459 N.W.2d at 604.
184. 202 N.W.2d at 7-8. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
case.
185. Barstad, 348 N.W.2d at 489. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Barstad.
186. Z.J.H., 459 N.W.2d at 605.
187. Id.
188. In re Soergel, 453 N.W.2d 624 (Wis. 1990).
189. Z.J.H., 459 N.W.2d at 605.
190. Id.
191. In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 204 (Wis. 1991).
192. Id.
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explain its decision that Sporleder did not have standing under Wis-
consin's custody statute.1"3 First, it relied on Barstad v. Frazier'"
and stated that nonparents cannot bring custody actions unless ei-
ther the legal parent is unfit or unable to care for the child or there
are compelling reasons for awarding custody to the nonparent.' 95
Sporleder had conceded that Hermes was a fit parent, 9 ' and the
court concluded that there was no issue of material fact regarding
the presence of "compelling reasons."' 97 Since Sporleder could not
obtain standing as a nonparent, the only way she could get custody
was to be considered a parent under the custody statute.
The court then decided that Sporleder was not a "parent" for the
purposes of the custody statute.' It acknowledged its previous
statement that the definition of "parent" could include a person in
loco parentis.'99 However, the court distinguished that statement on
the basis that it applied only to visitation rights as opposed to cus-
tody rights.200 It then discussed the implications of applying an in
loco parentis approach to custody disputes and declared that the
approach would violate Wisconsin's adherence to the "parental pref-
erence" standard.2 0 ' This standard would give Hermes rights as the
natural parent while regarding Sporleder as a third party who could
not obtain custody unless Hermes was declared to be an unfit par-
ent. The court expressed concern that the use of the doctrine would
infringe on the "constitutionally protected interest in a parental re-
lationship with the child. 20 2
Next the court examined the legislative history of the custody
statute.2 0 3 It found that the legislature intended "parent" to mean
"biological parent, a husband who has consented to the artificial in-
193. Id. at 204-05. The custody statute is codified at WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1992).
194. 348 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1984).
195. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 205.
196. Id.
197. Id. Compelling circumstances can include "abandonment, persistent neglect of parental
responsibilities, extended disruption of parental custody," and other extraordinary circumstances.
Id. at 206.
198. id. at 206.
199. See In re D.M.M., 404 N.W.2d 530 (Wis. 1987).
200. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 207.
201. Id. ("While [the standard] recognizes the rights of children, it also assumes that normally
it is in the best interests of the child to be raised by fIis or her parent.").
202. Id. (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972)).
203. Id. at 208.
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semination of his wife . . . or a parent by adoption."2 4
Finally, the court decided that a decision recognizing in loco
parentis in the context of custody disputes would violate the "public
policy consideration of limiting the number of individuals with
whom a child is placed, in order to promote stability in that child's
life." 20 5 The court admitted that its decision might result in "occa-
sional unfortunate circumstances" for children, but it insisted that
the legislature "deliberately spared the legal system from an obliga-
tion to discern a just result from among the myriad of circum-
stances in which individuals could claim rights under the in loco
parentis doctrine."2 6 Thus, Sporleder's claim under the custody
statute failed.
2. The Visitation Statute
Similarly, the court held that Sporleder had no rights under Wis-
consin's visitation statute.20 7 The court relied on its holdings in In re
Soergel 0 18 and Van Cleve v. Hemminger °9 and declared that
Sporleder could not obtain visitation rights in the absence of the
filing of an "underlying action affecting the family unit," such as
divorce or legal separation.210
3. The Coparenting Agreement
Sporleder's effort to enforce the coparenting contract was also un-
successful. The court declared the coparenting agreement to be in-
valid for two reasons. First, it concluded that custody and visitation
rights are controlled solely by statutes and by case law and that
they cannot be contracted away.21" ' The court reasoned that the leg-
islature had expressed its preference of parents over third parties in
the custody and visitation statutes and that the contract was invalid
since it conflicted with legislative intent.2 2
The court next maintained that the contract was void for public
204. Id. This definition is given in the definitional section of the Children's Code, WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 48.02 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992).
205. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 208.
206. Id. at 209.
207. Id.
208. 453 N.W.2d 624 (Wis. 1990); see supra notes 110-13 (discussing Soergel).
209. 415 N.W.2d 571 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); see supra notes 105-09 (discussing Van Cleve).
210. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 209-10.
211. Id. at 211.
212. Id.
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213policy reasons. According to the majority, the public has an "in-
terest in maintaining a stable relationship between a child and his or
her parent" and granting custody to Sporleder would be contrary to
that public interest. 14 The court then compared the coparenting
agreement to the contract in Stickles v. Reichardt2' 5 and decided
that the "public interest in maintaining a stable relationship be-
tween a child and his or her legal parent" outweighed Sporleder's
expectations under the contract."'
D. Equitable Estoppel
Finally, the court held that Hermes was not equitably estopped
from denying that Sporleder was a parent of the child. 11 It distin-
guished In re A.M.N. and A.J.N.21 8 and In re L.M.S.'and S.L.S.
21 9
by noting that those two cases used equitable estoppel to impose
child support obligations, not to grant the right to custody.220 The
court stated that In re D.L.H.221 was "dissimilar" in that it used the
equitable estoppel doctrine as a "shield" to protect the stepfather's
right to a relationship with a child.222 In re D.L.J. and R.R.J 2 3 was
distinguished on the basis that the stepfather in that case truly be-
lieved he was the natural father of the child. The court declared
that Sporleder, unlike the stepfather in that case, could never have
believed she was the legal parent of the child. 4
E. The Dissenting Opinions
Two of the seven justices dissented, each writing a separate opin-
ion. In the first dissent, Justice Abrahamson argued that the major-
ity's analysis of the coparenting agreement was incorrect.2 She
stated that the visitation and custody statutes do not expressly or
impliedly preempt such agreements, and she emphasized the parties'
213. Id.
214. Id. at 212.
215. 234 N.W. 728 (Wis. 1931); see supra notes 124-31 (discussing Stickles).
216. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 211-12.
217. Id. at 212.
218. 414 N.W.2d 68 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); supra note 156.
219. 312 N.W.2d 853 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981); supra note 156.
220. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 212 n.15.
221. 419 N.W.2d 283 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); supra notes 158-61.
222. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 212.
223. 469 N.W.2d 877 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991); supra notes 162-63.
224. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 213.
225. Id. at 213 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
19931 1153
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
right to contract.22 The justice noted that many contracts affect pa-
rental relationships and maintained that "[t]hese contracts are not
per se against public policy. ' 227 Citing Watts v. Watts,228 she stated
that a contract can be declared void for public policy reasons only
after balancing "the public policies favoring enforcement ...
against the public policies disfavoring enforcement. 229 She also
quoted section 191 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, con-
cluding that a contract is unenforceable for public policy reasons
unless it serves the best interests of the child.230
Justice Abrahamson found Stickles v. Reichardt23 ' to be distin-
guishable both in facts and in reasoning.232 In Stickles, the supreme
court invalidated a contract that allowed a biological father to have
visitation after he gave up his son for adoption.23 3 Justice Abraham-
son emphasized that Stickles relied on the best interests of the
child, not the validity of the contract.234 She concluded that "the
case should be remanded for a hearing and that the circuit court
should consider such public policies as protection of freedom of con-
tract, protection against impairment of family relations, and the
best interests of the child. 233
In a separate dissent, Justice Bablitch also was disturbed by the
majority's failure to consider the best interests of the child. 2" He
felt that the opinion held that "children of a dissolving non-tradi-
tional relationship are not entitled to the same protection" as those
in dissolving traditional relationships. 2 3 7 Justice Bablitch noted that
Van Cleve v. Hemminger2 38 stands for the proposition that third
parties often should be granted visitation rights to help the child get
through the dissolution of a family relationship. 239 He argued that
children faced with dissolving nontraditional relationships deserve
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987). See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of Watts.
229. 471 N.W.2d at 214.(Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
230. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 191 (1981)).
231. 234 N.W. 728 (Wis. 1931).
232. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 214 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
233. 234 N.W. at 729.
234. 471 N.W.2d at 214 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
235. Id.
236. 471 N.W.2d at 214-15 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
237. Id.
238. 415 N.W.2d 571 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
239. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 215 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
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that same protection.24 Finally, the justice stated that the Wiscon-
sin legislature could not have intended the majority's result, espe-
cially since that result ignored the best interests of the child.241 Like
Abrahamson, he concluded that the case should have been re-
manded to the circuit court for an analysis of the best interests of
Z.J.H.242
III. ANALYSIS
In In re Z.J.H., the Wisconsin Supreme Court was faced with a
difficult and controversial situation. The court's decision undoubt-
edly will be very unpopular among the many advocates of third-
party rights in nontraditional families due to the court's analysis,
which is even more disturbing than the result of the case. The Wis-
consin court failed to adhere to the advice of the Utah Supreme
Court: "The question of who should have custody of [a] child is too
important to exclude participants on narrowly drawn technical
grounds."243 Instead, the Wisconsin court used such narrowly drawn
reasoning to avoid analysis of the best interests of the child. It over-
emphasized the rights of Hermes despite evidence that she had in-
tended to share her parental rights and responsibilities with
Sporleder. Had the court analyzed the two women and the child as
a family unit and then decided that visitation and custody were in-
appropriate, its decision might have been more palatable. Instead,
the court ignored the realities of the situation and failed to use
much of the reasoning that it had used in similar traditional-family
cases throughout the years.
A. The Denial of Statutory Rights
1. The Custody Statute
The court correctly concluded that Sporleder could not obtain
custody of the child as a third party under the custody statute.
Sporleder did not allege that Hermes was an unfit mother,244 and no




243. In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 716 (Utah 1990) (granting a stepfather custody standing).
244. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 205.
245. 348 N.W.2d 479, 489 (Wis. 1984) (including abandonment, persistent neglect of parental
responsibilities, extended disruption of parental custody, or other similar circumstances that would
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were present in the case. The court interpreted "compelling circum-
stances" to include only situations in which there is a deficiency in
the relationship between the (natural) parent and the child.24 6 This
interpretation seems correct since a broader meaning would severely
dilute the standard set out in the Wisconsin custody statute. 47
While the court was correct in denying Sporleder custody as a
third party, it incorrectly denied her standing as a parent under the
doctrine of in loco parentis. The court refused to use this doctrine
because it felt that it was inconsistent with the parental preference
standard. 248 However, that standard is greatly flawed in that it does
not distinguish between different types of third parties.249
The majority in Z.J.H. stated that the parental preference stan-
dard assumes that "it is in the best interests of the child to be raised
by his or her natural parent."2 50 This assumption is inappropriate in
the context of same-sex couples. Unlike many other nontraditional
families, same-sex couples generally make a mutual decision that
both mothers (or fathers) will act as parents. In this situation, there
is no reason to assume that one mother is better than the other sim-
ply because she gave birth to or formally adopted the child.251
There is considerable support from both courts and commentators
for the proposition that a best interests analysis should take place
regardless of who is petitioning for custody. 252 The Z.J.H. majority
drastically affect the welfare of the child as "compelling circumstances")
246. Z.J.l., 471 N.W.2d at 206.
247. See supra text accompanying note 77 for the provisions of the statute.
248. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 207; see supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing the
parental preference standard).
249. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 512.
250. 471 N.W.2d at 207.
251. See generally Salthe, supra note 64. This commentator maintains that the "general rule
used in many states favoring natural parents over other individuals in custody battles is an archaic
and often harmful rule." Id. at 550.
252. See BLACK & CANTOR. supra note 21, at 68. These authors recommend that: (1) "[a]ny
person be allowed to seek rights of custody and/or visitation whether or not a divorce is pending,
regardless of that person's relationship to the child, and with the full status of a party to any
existing controversy"; and (2) "[t]he best interests of the child should be in any action the sole
barometer utilized to apportion custodial and visitation rights." Id. See In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d
710, 714 (Utah 1990), where the court states:
It may be that no one has the same rights toward a child as his or her parents.
However, the fact that a person is not a child's natural or legal parent does not mean
that he or she must stand as a total stranger to the child where custody is concerned.
Certain people, because of their relationship to a child are at least entitled to standing
to seek a determination as to whether it would be in the best interests of the child for
them to have custody.
Id. On remand, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision that third-party custody was
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expressed concern that a broader definition of parent would allow
"housekeepers, prior companions, day-care providers and others"
standing to seek custody.25 The court stated that it would be almost
impossible to protect the best interests of the child under the
broader standard.5 4 However, the court's worries could be overcome
if it imposed "a heavy substantive burden on those who try to over-
come a parental preference.1"2 55 For example, the third party could
be required to show that: 1) she stood in loco parentis to the child
and 2) the biological or adoptive parent intended for her to assume
this position permanently. This standard would distinguish same-sex
partners from housekeepers and babysitters since most parents do
not express an intent for housekeepers and babysitters to perma-
nently act in loco parentis to their children.
While the court in Z.J.H. expressed an unwavering faith in the
parental preference standard, this has not always been the case. In
Mawhinney v. Mawhinney, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared
that the rights of even a competent parent will not always overcome
the best interest of the child. The court then ruled that the child's
grandparents should have custody, even though the father was not
unfit.25 The Z.J.H. majority distinguished Mawhinney on the basis
that it involved compelling circumstances (virtual abandonment).25 7
In Barstad v. Frazier,2 58 the court wrote that "biological relation-
ship is not solely determinative of the existence of a family" and
that "the zone of constitutionally protected family autonomy is not
defined solely by genetic ties."259 This case was distinguished by the
majority on the grounds that it, too, involved "compelling circum-
stances. '"26 While the facts of these two decisions differ considera-
bly from those in Z.J.H., the reasoning should apply. The best inter-
ests of the child is an interest that should be considered above all
others, even those of the natural parent. The assumption that grant-
ing biological or adoptive parents exclusive parental rights invaria-
bly protects the best interests of the child is both unrealistic and
not in the best interests of the child. In re J.W:F., 822 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
253. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 208 n.10.
254. Id. at 209.
255. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 510.
256. Mawhinney v. Mawhinney, 225 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Wis. 1975).
257. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 206.
258. 348 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1984).
259. Id. at 486.
260. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 206.
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outdated.
Virtually no one will dispute that Hermes has a constitutionally
protected right to care for her child. However, it is not clear that
this right is absolute when pitted against the best interests of the
child. 261 The fact that Sporleder was the child's primary caretaker
suggests that she did sustain an in loco parentis relationship. The
intentions of the women, combined with this in loco parentis rela-
tionship, strongly support the argument that Sporleder also had
rights concerning the child.
If the court had conferred the status of parent on Sporleder, she
would not have automatically gained custody rights, but at least she
would have had the opportunity to show that she could better serve
the best interests of the child. In the event that Sporleder did obtain
the status of a legal parent, Z.J.H. would benefit in many ways. He
would retain the parent-child relationship that he had during the
first year of his life while also obtaining other legal and economic
benefits. For example, Z.J.H. might have gained additional eco-
nomic security, eligibility for intestate succession to Sporleder's es-
tate, and eligibility for Social Security benefits in the event of
Sporleder's death or disability.26 2 Moreover, if Sporleder were to be-
come employed in a position that offered medical or educational
benefits to its employees' children, Z.J.H. may have been eligible for
those benefits.263
2. The Visitation Statute
The Wisconsin legislature expressly granted visitation standing to
persons who have sustained a parent-child relationship with a
child. 264 However, the Z.J.H. court found that third parties cannot
have standing under this provision unless there is an underlying ac-
tion affecting a family unit.265 Since lesbians currently have no way
of entering into a legal marriage, there is no possible way for
Sporleder to obtain visitation rights under this reading of the stat-
ute. This result defies the intention of the legislature.266
261. See supra notes 47-60 (discussing the competing interests of the parents' constitutional
rights and the best interests of the child).
262. See In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 998-99 (Sur. Ct. 1992).
263. See id.
264. See supra text accompanying note 102 (quoting Wisconsin's current visitation statute).
265. In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 209 (Wis. 1991).
266. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing the Wisconsin legislature's com-
ments to the current visitation statute).
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The court relied on the statutory interpretations discussed in
Soergel"7 and Van Cleve v. Hemminger.6 8 Both decisions declared
that the legislature did not intend the visitation statute to interfere
with families that are "intact."2 9 The reasoning behind these deci-
sions was sound. In Soergel, the court refused to extend visitation
rights to grandparents whose son had agreed to allow his child's
stepfather to adopt him.270 In Van Cleve, an appellate court denied
visitation rights to a grandmother after both parents had decided
not to allow visitation. 71
Neither of these decisions involved a child who was in the midst
of a disrupted family relationship. Z.J.H., however, was a victim of
a dissolving family relationship. 72 Emotionally, the separation of
Sporleder and Hermes paralleled a divorce or separation in a tradi-
tional family. For the first-year of his life, Z.J.H. had two parental
figures. 27 13 After the separation, he lived with one mother and then
faced a battle between two people who had both served as parents.
Meanwhile, he was deprived of the care and companionship of
Sporleder.2 74 To deny that this separation has the same affect as a
divorce is to deny the reality that homosexual couples can form
bona fide families.
The Z.J.H court declared that the legislature must have been
aware of the Van Cleve decision when it enacted the new visitation
law and that it would have expanded the statute further if it had
intended to extend rights to same-sex couples. 275 The legislature un-
doubtedly was aware of the Van Cleve decision; however, the facts
in that case vary so greatly from the facts in Z.J.H. that it seems
unlikely that it analogized the two situations. What is apparent is
that the legislature clearly wanted to ensure that children are able
to maintain relationships with persons with whom they had a par-
267. 453 N.W.2d 624 (Wis. 1990).
268. 415 N.W.2d 571, 573-74 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
269. Soergel, 453 N.W.2d at 627-28; Van Cleve, 415 N.W.2d at 573.
270. Soergel, 453 N.W.2d at 628.
271. Van Cleve, 415 N.W.2d at 574.
272. In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 204 (Wis. 1991).
273. Id.
274. "[Tlhe greatest damage to children living with nontraditional caretakers occurs when they
are forced to relinquish the attachments formed with these parents. Children of lesbian parents,
for example, experience sadness and loss when they are separated from one of their mothers, much
as children might mourn the loss or absence of a biological parent." Looking for a Family Resem-
blance, supra note 24, at 1657 n.94.




It is important to note that the Wisconsin Supreme Court created
grandparent visitation rights before the legislature decided to do
SO.2 7 7 In Weichman, the court was persuaded by the fact that there
was no statute forbidding a court from granting visitation rights to
third parties.278 Wisconsin currently has no statute preventing the
court from extending visitation rights when homosexual relation-
ships dissolve. The reasoning and policy behind the current statute
support a judicial determination that children raised by a same-sex
couple deserve to maintain ties with parental figures, just as chil-
dren of divorce have that right. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ex-
tended visitation rights to grandparents without explicit statutory
authorization. It should not have backed away from the opportunity
to extend similar rights to same-sex partners.
Had the court chosen not to exclude Sporleder on a technicality,
she easily would have qualified for visitation rights under Wiscon-
sin's visitation statute. The statute allows a person to petition for
visitation if she has "maintained a relationship similar to a parent-
child relationship with the child. 2 79 In essence, this wording de-
scribes the in loco parentis relationship that Sporleder had devel-
oped with the child. Unfortunately for both Sporleder and the child,
this relationship was completely terminated by the court's decision.
B. The Coparenting Agreement
The Wisconsin court summarily dismissed the coparenting agree-
ment by stating that custody and visitation rights "are controlled by
statutory and case law, and cannot be contracted away."280 As Jus-
tice Abrahamson correctly pointed out in her dissent, however, the
Wisconsin statutes do not "expressly or impliedly bar parents from
entering into agreements about the physical placement, care and fi-
nancial support of a child that protect the best interests of the
child." '281 Four years earlier, in Watts, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court extended statutory, marital property law to unmarried
276. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing the Wisconsin legislature's com-
ments to the current visitation statute).
277. See Ponsford v. Crute, 202 N.W.2d 5, 9 (Wis. 1972); Weichman v. Weichman, 184
N.W.2d 882, 884 (Wis. 1971).
278. Weichman, 184 N.W.2d at 884.
279. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West Supp. 1992).
280. In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 211 (Wis. 1991).
281. 471 N.W.2d at 213 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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couples while declaring that a court should not always wait for the
legislature to give it direction before resolving disputes between un-
married couples.2"2 The case for judicial intervention is even
stronger in Z.J.H. Sporleder and Hermes's separation has serious
consequences for Z.J.H., as a similar situation would for any chil-
dren of same-sex couples. The court's decision to wait for legislative
guidance will only suspend the rights of children and homosexuals
throughout the state.
In declaring the coparenting contract void, the court relied heav-
ily on its 1931 decision in Stickles v. Reichardt. 83 While the court
in Stickles did declare a visitation agreement to be unenforceable, it
did so only after careful consideration of the child's best interests.2 84
In fact, the court explicitly stated that the determinative factor in
evaluating custody contracts is the best interests of the child, not the
validity of the contract.28 Both Stickles and Watts involved a bal-
ancing of the interests of all involved parties.2 86 The Z.J.H. court
neglected to apply the same reasoning. A proper contract analysis
would have voided the coparenting agreement only if it was not in
the best interests of the child. Instead, the court looked only at the
"public interest in maintaining a stable relationship between a child
and his or her legal parent. '287 Surely, the public also has a simi-
larly strong interest in protecting the best interests of the child. Al-
though some may argue that lesbian parenting is never in the best
interests of the child,2 8 the reasoning behind this argument is not
supported by research.289
Had the court balanced public interest against the best interests
of the child, it may have found that the best interests of the child
were better served by allowing him to maintain a relationship with
both of his parental figures.
282. Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 311 (Wis. 1987).
283. 234 N.W. 728 (Wis. 1931).
284. Id. at 730.
285. Id.
286. Id.; Watts, 405 N.W.2d at 309-10.
287. In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 212 (Wis. 1991).
288. For an example, see the text accompanying supra note 2.
289. See In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1001 n.l (Sur. Ct. 1992). The Evan court stated:
"Concern that a child would be disadvantaged by growing up in a single sex household is not
borne out by the professional literature examined by this Court." Id. (citing more than ten differ-
ent studies); see also Dooley, supra note 5, at 414-23 (explaining why arguments against gay





Before Z.J.H., the Wisconsin appellate courts had consistently ac-
cepted equitable estoppel as a fair and appropriate means of impos-
ing the rights and responsibilities of parenthood on third parties.290
The supreme court did not reject the concept of estoppel in the pre-
vious cases; however, it refused to accept estoppel in the context of
same-sex couples.291 The court claimed that Sporleder was attempt-
ing to use equitable estoppel as a "sword" instead of as a "shield"
against a paternity action as it was used in D.L.H.292 This is an
artificial distinction. In the court's words, the husband in that case
used the estoppel defense "to protect his right to a relationship with
the child."291 3 Sporleder was attempting to assert her right in pre-
cisely the same way. She had developed a parental relationship with
the child and was trying to protect this relationship just as a hus-
band might.
The court also distinguished D.L.J. and R.R.J.,294 stating that
R.R.J. had the "status of 'natural parent' " before the blood test.295
The court believed that Z.J.H. presented a different scenario in that
neither woman believed that Sporleder was the legal parent of the
child.298 This assertion is probably true since currently there is no
way that Sporleder could hope to achieve the status of natural par-
ent of this child. However, the equitable estoppel doctrine does not
require that the third party believe she was the legal parent; it
merely requires a reasonable reliance on the natural parent's asser-
tions regarding the third party's status.291 Under the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court's interpretation of estoppel, the concept would be ap-
propriate only when a biological mother lied to her husband
regarding the paternity of her child.
The situation in Z.J.H. fits well within the requirements for equi-
290. In re D.L.J. and R.R.J., 469 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that equita-
ble estoppel may be used to grant visitation rights to stepparents); In re D.L.H., 419 N.W.2d 283,
286 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing equitable estoppel to be used to stop a wife from instituting
paternity proceedings to prove her husband was not the biological father of her child); In re
A.J.N. and J.M.N., 414 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that principles of equitable
estoppel are available for use in child support proceedings).
291. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 212.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. 469 N.W.2d 877 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
295. Z.J.H.. 471 N.W.2d at 213.
296. Id.
297. This is necessarily so in both the stepparent context and the homosexual context.
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table estoppel. Hermes represented to Sporleder that both women
would have parental status.298 The coparenting agreement was evi-
dence of that representation as were the facts that the two women
lived together for eight years and that they first tried to have a child
by using artificial insemination to impregnate Sporleder. Sporleder
reasonably relied on that representation. Her willingness to assume
the responsibility of primary caregiver indicated her expectation
that she would also have the rights of a parent. Finally, Sporleder
relied on Hermes's representation to her detriment. It is not difficult
to imagine the trauma experienced by Sporleder when she was sepa-
rated from a child whom she had helped raise during the first year
of his life. Thus, all three elements of equitable estoppel were met in
this case.
Equitable estoppel would also protect the interests of the child, in
that a child can also rely on the parents' representations of their
status, to his detriment.299 It should not matter that the child was
not old enough to question whether Sporleder was his biological
mother. °0 Instead, the focus should be on the child's psychological
relationship with his parents. Had the relationship between
Sporleder and Hermes continued, their child might have called both
women "mommy" and relied on both of them to fulfill parental
roles. Equitable estoppel would protect this reliance by the child.
Sporleder presented the Wisconsin Supreme Court with four solid
legal grounds for granting her parental rights: the custody statute,
the visitation statute, the coparenting agreement, and the equitable
estoppel doctrine. By failing to accept Sporleder's arguments, the
court ignored the plights of Sporleder, the child, and others simi-
larly situated throughout the state of Wisconsin.
IV. IMPACT
The court's decision in Z.J.H. will have an adverse affect not only
298. One commentator lists other ways in which this representation can be found: (1) the child
may be treated as "part of both mothers' extended families"; (2) the child may have the last
names of both parties; (3) a birth announcement may list two mothers; and (4) the "legally unrec-
ognized mother can contribute to the child's financial support and the legally recognized mother
can accept such payment." Polikoff, supra note 3, at 499.
299. Id. at 500.
300. Even if the child was old enough, his views of the biological relationship should have little
relevance. "It is not determinative whether the child believes she is biologically related to both her
parents; indeed, it would be offensive to develop a rule of law that depends upon parents lying to
their children." Id.
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on same-sex couples who wish to raise children together, but also on
the children themselves. Homosexual couples will have virtually no
way to ensure that both parties are considered parents of the child.
The nonadoptive or nonbiological party cannot obtain custody or
visitation under the Wisconsin statutes .3l The court will not declare
any coparenting agreement involving custody or visitation to be
valid. 0 2 Finally, the "third party" may not use equity concepts to
prevent the "parent" from denying her former partner her rights.303
The court's decision will serve only to make the law less fair and
more confusing; it will, however, not deter homosexuals from mak-
ing the decision to raise a child together.30' As a result, the nonbio-
logical parent will be deprived of her reasonable expectation of
parenthood, and the child will be deprived of a relationship with
someone who has served as a parental figure in his or her life.
In Z.J.H., the child had not even turned one year old when
Sporleder and Hermes separated.30 5 However, a similar situation
could occur involving a child who is much older and who has estab-
lished complex emotional and psychological relationships with both
parties. The court left no room for a best interests analysis that
could prevent the child from being separated from a person he or
she considers to be a parent. Some lesbian couples have decided to
raise two children, with one woman the legal parent of each child.306
Under the Z.J.H. decision, a separation of a couple with two chil-
dren could result in the permanent separation of children who con-
sidered themselves to be siblings. Situations like those described
above generally do not occur when the children are a product of a
heterosexual marriage. These children are protected by the best in-
terests of the child standard. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has ap-
parently decided that children of nontraditional families do not de-
serve the same protection.307
Furthermore, since the right to visitation and the duty to pay
child support go hand-in-hand,308 the court's decision will effectively
301. In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Wis. 1991).
302. Id. at 212.
303. Id. at 213.
304. See Polikoff, supra note 3, at 486.
305. Z.J.H.. 471 N.W.2d at 204.
306. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 466.
307. See Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 214 (Bablitch, J, dissenting).
308. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between the child
support obligation and visitation rights).
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allow the nonbiological parent to avoid any child support obliga-
tions. Such a result could be financially disastrous for both the legal
mother and for the child. Consider the example of a child who was
afflicted with a serious disease that absorbed both the time and the
money of the legal mother. If the other mother was estranged from
the legal mother and refused to pay child support, both the child
and the legal mother would suffer. Thus, the Z.J.H. case has the
potential to negatively impact both adult parties and the child.
CONCLUSION
The traditional, nuclear family is simply not as prevalent as it
once was; it has been joined by the nontraditional family. Children
are being raised in homes that provide a variety of parental figures.
Families may differ both in the number of parental figures and the
gender of the parties. While many people would prefer to see the
legislature make decisions regarding nontraditional families, it is
virtually impossible for the legislative bodies to keep up with the
constant challenges presented by society.
If all of the state courts treat same-sex couples and their children
as the Wisconsin Supreme Court has, these families will be deprived
of the benefit of having the judicial system help them with their
disputes. Even worse, children of the nontraditional families will be
deprived of the benefit of the best interests of the child standard. As
Justice Bablitch pointed out in his dissent, "children of non-tradi-
tional relationships are just as likely to become victims of parental
warfare in a dissolving relationship as are any other children."3 9
The Z.J.H. decision is harmful and unfair. Hopefully, the Wiscon-
sin legislature will act to ensure that its laws reflect the reality of
today's families, as opposed to the narrow views of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.
Melisa G. Thompson
309. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 215 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
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